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deb-mbse/unix/env.c

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2009-05-15 20:01:56 +00:00
/*****************************************************************************
*
* $Id: env.c,v 1.3 2005/08/30 17:53:35 mbse Exp $
* Purpose ...............: MBSE BBS Shadow Password Suite
* Original Source .......: Shadow Password Suite
* Original Copyright ....: Julianne Frances Haugh and others.
*
*****************************************************************************
* Copyright (C) 1997-2005
*
* Michiel Broek FIDO: 2:280/2802
* Beekmansbos 10
* 1971 BV IJmuiden
* the Netherlands
*
* This file is part of MBSE BBS.
*
* This BBS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any
* later version.
*
* MBSE BBS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with MBSE BBS; see the file COPYING. If not, write to the Free
* Software Foundation, 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
*****************************************************************************/
#include "../config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mblogin.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/*
* NEWENVP_STEP must be a power of two. This is the number
* of (char *) pointers to allocate at a time, to avoid using
* realloc() too often.
*/
#define NEWENVP_STEP 16
size_t newenvc = 0;
char **newenvp = NULL;
extern char **environ;
static const char *forbid[] = {
"_RLD_=",
"BASH_ENV=", /* GNU creeping featurism strikes again... */
"ENV=",
"HOME=",
"IFS=",
"KRB_CONF=",
"LD_", /* anything with the LD_ prefix */
"LIBPATH=",
"MAIL=",
"NLSPATH=",
"PATH=",
"SHELL=",
"SHLIB_PATH=",
(char *) 0
};
/* these are allowed, but with no slashes inside
(to work around security problems in GNU gettext) */
static const char *noslash[] = {
"LANG=",
"LANGUAGE=",
"LC_", /* anything with the LC_ prefix */
(char *) 0
};
/*
* initenv() must be called once before using addenv().
*/
void initenv(void)
{
newenvp = (char **)xmalloc(NEWENVP_STEP * sizeof(char *));
*newenvp = NULL;
}
void addenv(const char *string, const char *value)
{
char *cp, *newstring;
size_t i;
size_t n;
if (value) {
newstring = xmalloc(strlen(string) + strlen(value) + 2);
snprintf(newstring, strlen(string) + strlen(value) + 2, "%s=%s", string, value);
} else {
newstring = xstrdup(string);
}
/*
* Search for a '=' character within the string and if none is found
* just ignore the whole string.
*/
cp = strchr(newstring, '=');
if (!cp) {
free(newstring);
return;
}
n = (size_t)(cp - newstring);
for (i = 0; i < newenvc; i++) {
if (strncmp(newstring, newenvp[i], n) == 0 &&
(newenvp[i][n] == '=' || newenvp[i][n] == '\0'))
break;
}
if (i < newenvc) {
free(newenvp[i]);
newenvp[i] = newstring;
return;
}
newenvp[newenvc++] = newstring;
/*
* Check whether newenvc is a multiple of NEWENVP_STEP.
* If so we have to resize the vector.
* the expression (newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0
* is equal to (newenvc % NEWENVP_STEP) == 0
* as long as NEWENVP_STEP is a power of 2.
*/
if ((newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0) {
char **__newenvp;
size_t newsize;
/*
* If the resize operation succeds we can
* happily go on, else print a message.
*/
newsize = (newenvc + NEWENVP_STEP) * sizeof(char *);
__newenvp = (char **)realloc(newenvp, newsize);
if (__newenvp) {
/*
* If this is our current environment, update
* environ so that it doesn't point to some
* free memory area (realloc() could move it).
*/
if (environ == newenvp)
environ = __newenvp;
newenvp = __newenvp;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Environment overflow\n");
free(newenvp[--newenvc]);
}
}
/*
* The last entry of newenvp must be NULL
*/
newenvp[newenvc] = NULL;
}
/*
* set_env - copy command line arguments into the environment
*/
void set_env(int argc, char * const *argv)
{
int noname = 1;
char variable[1024];
char *cp;
for ( ; argc > 0; argc--, argv++) {
if (strlen(*argv) >= sizeof variable)
continue; /* ignore long entries */
if (! (cp = strchr (*argv, '='))) {
snprintf(variable, sizeof variable, "L%d", noname++);
addenv(variable, *argv);
} else {
const char **p;
for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
if (strncmp(*argv, *p, strlen(*p)) == 0)
break;
if (*p) {
strncpy(variable, *argv, cp - *argv);
variable[cp - *argv] = '\0';
printf("You may not change $%s\n", variable);
continue;
}
addenv(*argv, NULL);
}
}
}
/*
* sanitize_env - remove some nasty environment variables
* If you fall into a total paranoia, you should call this
* function for any root-setuid program or anything the user
* might change the environment with. 99% useless as almost
* all modern Unixes will handle setuid executables properly,
* but... I feel better with that silly precaution. -j.
*/
void sanitize_env(void)
{
char **envp = environ;
const char **bad;
char **cur;
char **move;
for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
for (bad = forbid; *bad; bad++) {
if (strncmp(*cur, *bad, strlen(*bad)) == 0) {
for (move = cur; *move; move++)
*move = *(move + 1);
cur--;
break;
}
}
}
for (cur = envp; *cur; cur++) {
for (bad = noslash; *bad; bad++) {
if (strncmp(*cur, *bad, strlen(*bad)) != 0)
continue;
if (!strchr(*cur, '/'))
continue; /* OK */
for (move = cur; *move; move++)
*move = *(move + 1);
cur--;
break;
}
}
}